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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-TRADEMARK LAW-VICTOR/VICTORIA?
-THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REQUIRES TRADEMARK DILUTION
PLAINTIFFS To SHOW ACTUAL HARM. Moseley v. Victoria's Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
I. INTRODUCTION
Victor Moseley did not venture into the world of lingerie and adult
novelty sales expecting to face-off with the biggest name in the lingerie
business: Victoria's Secret.' Victoria's Secret immediately sent a cease-and-
desist letter to Mr. Moseley upon learning that he named his small-town
Kentucky establishment "Victor's Secret."'2 Although Mr. Moseley obliged
Victoria's Secret's demand and altered the name of his store to "Victor's
Little Secret," an unsatisfied Victoria's Secret proceeded to sue in federal
district court for an injunction. 3 In district court Victoria's Secret success-
fully argued that Mr. Moseley's use of the name Victor's Little Secret vio-
lated the Federal Trademark and Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA).4 The pur-
pose of the FTDA is to prevent the "lessening of the capacity of a famous
trademark to identify and distinguish" the trademark owner's goods and
services.5 The FTDA provides for an injunction of a trademark that "causes
dilution of the distinctive quality" of a famous trademark.6 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the injunction of Mr.
Moseley's use of the name Victor's Little Secret. 7 The United States Su-
preme Court reversed, however, requiring a plaintiff in a trademark dilution
case to show proof of actual harm to the economic value of a trademark.8
The Moseley decision overrules a long history of dilution precedent, creates
a more reliable remedy for the owners of famous trademarks, and helps fa-
cilitate the entry of new businesses into the marketplace. 9 This note relates
the facts of the Moseley case,' 0 discusses the background of the FTDA,"
1. David G. Savage, Court Says Victor's Secret Safe: Lingerie Giant Fails to Sway
Justices, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5, 2003, available at 2003 WL 14861422.
2. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 4, Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 01-1015).
3. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1092, 1096 (W.D. Ky.
2000).
4. Id.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
7. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 477 (6th Cir. 2001).
8. Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003).
9. See infra Part V.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
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and explains the rationale and significance of the Supreme Court's require-
ment of actual harm for relief under the FTDA. 12
II. FACTS
Victor Moseley lost his job in 1997.13 When Mr. Moseley and his wife,
Cathy, could no longer depend on Mr. Moseley's unemployment benefits
for financial support, they decided to open an adult gift and novelty store.
14
The Moseleys used money from their personal savings and credit cards as
capital to finance their store, which opened in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, in
February of 1998.15 Because they wanted to keep the store a secret from
Victor's former employer, the Moseleys named the store "Victor's Se-
cret." 16 The Moseleys also kept their new store a secret from family and
friends. 17 The slogan of Victor's Secret was "Everything for Romantic En-
counters."'18 Victor's Secret was approximately twelve hundred square feet,
and its inventory included lingerie, incense, lycra dresses, leather clothes,
adult videos, and novelties.19 The Moseleys separated the adult videos and
novelties from the rest of their inventory by placing the adult videos and
novelties in an eight by ten foot section located in the back of Victor's Se-
cret.20 Customers purchasing items from this section of the store had to
place the items in plain brown paper bags before going to the register.21
The Moseleys advertised the debut of Victor's Secret in local newspa-
pers, as well as in a publication called "Inside The Turret," a newspaper
distributed at the Fort Knox U.S. Army base near Elizabethtown.22 Colonel
John E. Baker, a member of the Judge Advocate General Corps, spotted the
Moseleys' ad and faxed it to the Victoria's Secret corporate headquarters.2 3
The colonel was offended that the Moseleys were using a variation of the
famous Victoria's Secret trademark to market their "'unwholesome, tawdry
merchandise."'
24
12. See infra Parts IV, V.




17. See Savage, supra note 1.
18. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 4, Moseley (No. 01-1015).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Brief for Respondents at 4, Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S.
418 (2003) (No. 01-1015).
22. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at4, Moseley (No. 01-1015).
23. Id.
24. Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 423 (2003). One reason
for the colonel's familiarity with Victoria's Secret was that his wife and daughter had
shopped there. Id. at 1125.
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Victoria's Secret opened its first store in California in 1977, and the
storeowners registered the Victoria's Secret trademark with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office in 1981.25 By 1998 Victoria's Secret
had expanded to more than 750 stores, distributed millions of catalogues,
and sold merchandise on its website, www.victoriassecret.com. 26 There are
two Victoria's Secret stores in Louisville, Kentucky, that are within sixty
miles of the Moseleys' store.27 In 1998 Victoria's Secret distributed more
than three and a half million of its catalogues to Kentucky residents.28 A
recent survey showed that Victoria's Secret is the ninth most recognizable
brand in the clothing industry. 29 Victoria's Secret's inventory includes lin-
gerie, sleepwear, fragrances, and bath products.3 °
Victoria's Secret sent the Moseleys a cease-and-desist letter on Febru-
ary 25, 1998. 31 The letter claimed that the Moseleys had violated Victoria's
Secret's federally registered trademark rights and that the Moseleys' store
name diluted the Victoria's Secret trademark.32 Subsequently, the Moseleys
changed the name of their store from Victor's Secret to "Victor's Little Se-
cret." Victoria's Secret, however, was not appeased and filed suit against
the Moseleys in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky on June 22, 1998.3 3 Victor Moseley expressed surprise that Victo-
ria's Secret sued his small, Kentucky store.34
A. The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky's
Analysis
Victoria's Secret based its claims of trademark infringement and unfair
competition on the Lanham Act, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, and
Kentucky common law.35 The Moseleys moved for summary judgment on
the federal trademark infringement claim because Victoria's Secret had not
presented evidence of a likelihood of confusion of its trademark with Vic-
25. Brief for Respondents at 2, Moseley (No. 01-1015).
26. Id. at 3.
27. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1092, 1093 (W.D. Ky.
2000).
28. Brief for Respondents at 3-4, Moseley (No. 01-1015).
29. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1093.
30. Brief for Respondents at 3, Moseley (No. 01-1015).
31. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 4, Moseley (No. 01-1015).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 4-5.
34. See Savage, supra note 1.
35. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1092, 1093 (W.D. Ky.
2000). See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000), infra note 105, for an explanation of the Lanham Act.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000), infra note 134, and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.
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tor's Little Secret.36 Victoria's Secret and the Moseleys both moved for
summary judgment on the FTDA claim.37
1. Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition Claims
The district court applied eight factors set out by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for evaluating the likelihood of con-
fusion: (1) the strength of the Victoria's Secret mark, (2) the relatedness of
Victoria's Secret's goods to the Moseleys' goods, (3) the similarity of the
two marks, (4) the evidence of actual consumer confusion, (5) the marketing
methods used by both parties, (6) the degree of consumer care and sophisti-
cation, (7) the Moseleys' intent in using their trademark, and (8) the likeli-
hood that the Moseleys would expand their business using the Victor's Lit-
tle Secret trademark.38
The Moseleys admitted that the Victoria's Secret trademark is strong
but submitted evidence showing that two hundred and fifty-seven other
trademarks contained the word "secret" and that fourteen other trademarks
resembled the Victoria's Secret trademark.39 Although the Moseleys had
pointed out that the only item sold by both parties was lingerie, and lingerie
sales only contributed to five percent of the Moseleys' total sales, the dis-
40trict court assumed that the parties' products were in direct competition.
When the district court compared the Moseleys' trademark with the
Victoria's Secret trademark, the district court found that the marks appeared
36. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1095.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1093. The distinctiveness of a trademark determines its strength. Id. at 1094.
There are three categories of relatedness: (1) directly competing services where confusion is
likely if the trademarks are "'suffciently similar' (2) related but uncompetitive services
where the likelihood of confusion depends on additional factors; and (3) completely unre-
lated services where confusion is not likely. Id. Testing for similarity of trademarks involves
considering the trademarks in context rather than a "side-by-side comparison." Id. The "de-
gree of purchaser care" is related to similarity analysis. Id. Purchasers exercise different
levels of care depending on what product they are purchasing. Id. If actual confusion exists,
"'[t]here can be no more positive or substantial proof of the likelihood of confusion than
proof of actual confusion."' Id. at 1094-95 (citing P.T.C. Brands, Inc. v. Conwood Co. L.P.,
887 F. Supp. 963, 969 (W.D. Ky. 1995)) (quoting World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Litterell's
New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir. 1971)). When comparing the marketing
channels used by the parties, the "scale of the advertising is irrelevant." Id. at 1095. If some-
one selects a trademark intending to cause confusion, "that fact alone may be sufficient to
justify an inference of confusing similarity." Id. (quoting Homeowner's Group, Inc. v. Home
Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1107 (6th Cir. 1991)). The likelihood of expansion of
a product line occurs when a business plans on extending its trade outside of the original area
of business. Id.




very similar.4' The court, however, determined that it should consider the
trademarks as a whole and in the context of their use.42 The court acknowl-
edged that analyzing the similarities between two trademarks often includes
viewing the degree of consumer care in purchasing products such as those
sold at a Victoria's Secret store.43 Consumers shopping at Victoria's Secret
would probably use a higher degree of care than if they were making im-
pulse buys, such as a fast food purchase. 44 Consumers, therefore, would
most likely not have a hard time figuring out that Victor's Little Secret is
not associated with Victoria's Secret.4 5 Victoria's Secret showed no evi-
dence of actual consumer confusion between the similar trademarks.46 In
addition, Victoria's Secret's marketing expert did not give an opinion on the
effect of the Victor's Little Secret trademark on the value of the Victoria's
Secret trademark.47
The district court noted that Victoria's Secret and Victor's Little Secret
used the same marketing forums: print advertisements and radio.4a The
Moseleys argued that their advertising was on a much smaller scale than
Victoria's Secret's.4 9 The court, however, countered that the Moseleys'
smaller advertising campaign may help show that the Moseleys were trying
to exploit the similarity of the two trademarks to sell their related merchan-
dise.50 The court assumed that the Moseleys had designed their trademark
with the intent of causing confusion between their mark and the Victoria's
Secret trademark.51 The Moseleys maintained that before opening Victor's
Secret, they had never seen a Victoria's Secret catalogue or ad. 52 In addi-
tion, the Moseleys did not express any intent of expanding Victor's Secret
outside of Elizabethtown, Kentucky.53
The district court determined that there was no likelihood of confusion
between the Moseleys' trademark and the Victoria's Secret trademark.54
The court granted the Moseleys' motion for summary judgment on Victo-
ria's Secret's federal trademark infringement claim. 55 Because the focus of
41. Id.
42. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1094.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Frisch's Rest., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642
(6th Cir. 1982)).
45. Id. at 1094.
46, Id.
47. Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 424-25 (2003).










federal unfair competition law is to prevent the likelihood of confusion, the
court also granted summary judgment to the Moseleys on Victoria's Se-
cret's federal unfair competition claim.56 Victoria's Secret's state trademark
infringement and unfair competition claims were similar to its federal
claims. The court, therefore, granted summary judgment to the Moseleys on
those claims as well.57 After granting the Moseleys' Motions for Summary
Judgment on the trademark infringement and unfair competition claims, the
district court turned to Victoria's Secret's federal trademark dilution
claim.58
2. The Dilution Claim
Victoria's Secret and the Moseleys moved for summary judgment on
Victoria's Secret's claim under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
(FTDA), which gives owners of famous trademarks a cause of action for an
injunction against the use of another trademark that causes dilution of the
famous trademark's distinctive quality.59 The district court found that the
Moseleys' trademark was "sufficiently similar" to the Victoria's Secret
trademark thereby causing dilution of the Victoria's Secret mark.60 The
court considered that the Moseleys changed the name of their store from
Victor's Secret to Victor's Little Secret, but the court dubbed this an insig-
nificant change and an "afterthought.",61 Because the Moseleys' inventory
included adult videos and sex toys as well as lingerie, the court found that
the Victor's Little Secret trademark caused dilution by tarnishing the Victo-
ria's Secret trademark.62 The court granted Victoria's Secret's motion for
summary judgment on its claim under the FTDA and enjoined the Moseleys
from using the Victor's Little Secret trademark, because the Moseleys' use
of the Victor's Little Secret trademark "cause[d] dilution of the distinctive
quality of the Victoria's Secret trademark., 63 The court also enjoined the
Moseleys from using any other mark similar to the Victoria's Secret trade-
mark "or any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of the
Victoria's Secret trademark." 64 The Moseleys appealed the district court's
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
65
56. Id.
57. Id.;see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
58. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1095.
59. Id.




64. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1096.
65. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 465-66 (6th Cir. 2001).
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B. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Affirms the
Finding of Dilution
On July 30, 2001 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion.66 Beginning with a discussion of the purpose of the FTDA, the Sixth
Circuit remarked that "[c]ourts have not made a uniform application of the
FTDA. ',67 The Sixth Circuit noted that the purpose of the FTDA is to pro-
vide a consistent level of trademark dilution protection for owners of fa-
mous trademarks.68 Until Moseley, the Sixth Circuit had not analyzed an
FTDA claim.69 The Sixth Circuit had to determine what factors to consider
in determining whether trademark dilution had occurred to the Victoria's
Secret trademark within the meaning of the FTDA. 70 The court recognized
that a circuit split existed over whether a trademark dilution plaintiff must
show actual harm to the trademark for relief under the FTDA.71 The Sixth
Circuit faced a decision between two conflicting standards: the likelihood of
harm requirement of the Second Circuit's decision in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF
Brands, Inc.72 and the actual harm requirement of the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Ringling Brothers v. UT Division of Travel Development.
73
Determining that the likelihood of dilution standard better represented
the language and intent of the FTDA than the actual dilution standard, the
Sixth Circuit adopted the Nabisco test for trademark dilution. 74 The court
doubted that Congress enacted the FTDA to provide a remedy for dilution
but left the task of proving dilution impossible for plaintiffs.75 Pointing to
the legislative history of the FTDA, the Sixth Circuit stated that Congress
aimed to provide a nationwide remedy for dilution.76 The Sixth Circuit em-
66. Id. at 477.
67. Id. at 468.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 471.
70. Id. at 471-72.
71. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 259 F.3d at 471.
72. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
73. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999). See also infra notes 185-88, 206-11, and accompany-
ing text.
74. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 259 F.3d at 475.
75. Id. at 476.
76. Id. at 475 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1032). The court quoted the explanation of dilution in the Congressional Record as
[A]n injury that differs materially from that arising out of the orthodox confu-
sion. Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated
by another's use. This is the essence of dilution. Confusion leads to immediate
injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably
destroy the advertising value of the mark.
Id. The Sixth Circuit stated that the FTDA's legislative history shows that "legislators were
attempting to ensure that plaintiffs could find a nationwide remedy for dilution claims, as
2004]
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phasized that requiring a trademark owner to prove actual harm to the
trademark would "make bringing a successful claim under the FTDA unrea-
sonably difficult.
77
The court then turned to a list of factors for evaluating dilution that the
Second Circuit established in Nabisco.78 The Sixth Circuit maintained that
the Victoria's Secret trademark was highly distinctive and that the Mose-
leys' trademark was very similar to the Victoria's Secret mark in font size
and word placement. 79 The court questioned whether a consumer would
associate Victor's Little Secret with Victoria's Secret.80 Although the court
remarked that a consumer would not likely patronize the Moseleys' store in
hopes of buying a Victoria's Secret Miracle Bra, a consumer would proba-
bly make a mental link between the two stores. 81 The Sixth Circuit termed
this case a "classic instance of dilution by tarnishing ... and by blurring.,
82
Thus, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Victo-
ria's Secret on its FTDA claim. 83 On April 15, 2002, the United States Su-
preme Court granted the Moseleys' petition for writ of certiorari to the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
84
III. BACKGROUND
The parent of trademark law is the broader law of unfair competition. 85
The essential function of a trademark is to enable a consumer to determine
who has produced an item that the consumer wants to purchase.86 Initially,
trademarks did not vest a property right in the trademark holder.87 Instead, a
trademark was simply a communication device used to imprint a symbol of
goodwill on the public mind. 88 Trademark law does not protect trademarks
distinct from the Lanham Act's established protection for trademark infringement." Id.
77. Id. at 476.
78. Id. (citing factors for determining dilution of Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191
F.3d 208) (2d Cir. 1999)).
79. Id. 476-77.
80. Victoria 's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 259 F.3d at 477.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. After the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, the Moseleys
changed the name of their store to Cathy's Little Secret. Linda Greenhouse, Retail Giant
Asks Court to Protect Its Name, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL
103085917.
84. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 259 F.3d 464, cert. granted, 535 U.S. 985 (2002).
85. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
86. Id. at 412.
87. Id. at 414.
88. Frank 1. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv.
813, 819 (1927). Goodwill is a "business value" that represents a consumer's tendency to
maintain a business relationship with a certain producer that sells goods the consumer appre-
310 [Vol. 26
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as "independent creative works, but only as product or service identifiers." 89
Trademarks free consumers from having to research different brands of a
good before making a purchasing decision. 90 Because a consumer may rely
on a particular brand purchased in the past, he or she may assume that pur-
chasing the same brand will result in obtaining a good of a consistent level
of quality.9' Market competition would be practically non-existent if con-
sumers could not distinguish one brand of a good from another. 92 By distin-
guishing between products, however, trademarks may "erect powerful bar-
iers to entry into a market. 93 Gradually, trademark law has developed to
provide protection for property rights in the trademarks themselves.94
Trademark law, therefore, advances two intertwined objectives-to prevent
consumer deception and to protect the trademark holders' property rights in
trademarks. 95 Trademark dilution results when a trademark reduces the ca-
ciates and finds adequate. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:17 (4th ed. 2003). The "favorable consideration shown by the purchasing
public to goods known to emanate from a particular source" establishes goodwill. Id. Intan-
gible characteristics such as the reputation of a business help determine goodwill. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 703 (7th ed. 1999).
89. Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 74-75
(1992).
90. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspec-
tive, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987).
91. Id.
92. Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis
for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 853 (1997).
93. Id.
94. Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Tech. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987).
95. Id. Fanciful or arbitrary trademarks earn the highest level of protection from in-
fringement. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976).
Suggestive trademarks have the second highest level of protection, and trademark owners do
not have to prove secondary meaning to obtain protection for a suggestive trademark. Id. at
9, 11. A trademark has secondary meaning if its owner can demonstrate that it has exclu-
sively used and advertised the mark to the point where the public associates the trademark
with the trademark owner or the owner's goods. Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades,
Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (N.Y. 1977). Descriptive trademarks are entitled to the third
highest level of protection from infringement; however, the trademark owner must show that
the trademark in question has acquired secondary meaning. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9-10.
A word like "CHEWY would be descriptive for a candy, but would be suggestive, or even
arbitrary or fanciful, if used in connection with bed sheets, a computer, or an automobile."
Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995). No trade-
mark owner may exclusively use words and symbols associated with a trademark if the pub-
lic has the right to use "words or images in good faith in their ordinary descriptive sense." Id.
For instance, a car air-freshener shaped like a tree is not necessarily entitled to trademark
protection. Id. at 270. Generic trademarks are traditionally the lowest priority of trademarks
and are not entitled to recognition. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. Weak or generic trademarks
are diluted by nature and cannot lose distinctiveness under a dilution theory. RUDOLF




pacity of a famous trademark to identify a particular brand of goods or ser-
vices. 96 This section discusses the development of the concept of trademark
dilution, state anti-dilution statutes, the FTDA, and the circuit split over the
requirement of actual harm in dilution cases.
A. The Concept of Dilution and Its Incorporation in Unfair Competition
Law
A 1927 Harvard Law Review article represents the birth of trademark
dilution theory.97 According to the author of the article, Frank I. Schechter,
the "preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the
only rational basis for its protection." 98 When a trademark has a greater de-
gree of distinctiveness or uniqueness, then "the deeper is its impress upon
the public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against vi-
tiation or dissociation from the particular product in connection with which
it has been used."99 Trademark dilution is "analogous to the situation where
the plaintiffs building is demolished stone by stone."' 00
Schechter discussed a German case in which non-competing steel
companies used a famous trademark for mouthwash, Odol, to market their
products.' 0' The German court reasoned that when the public sees the word
"Odol" it associates the word with mouthwash and may assume that what-
ever product is sold under the name "Odol" is of good quality.10 2 The court
concluded by stating that the producer of the mouthwash has "the utmost
interest in seeing that its mark is not diluted," because the trademark "would
lose in selling power if everyone used it as the designation of his goods."'
0 3
Twenty years after the Schechter article, Massachusetts enacted the
first state anti-dilution statute in 1947.104 Congress debated adding a dilution
amendment to the Lanham Act'0 5 in 1988 but did not do so because of the
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
97. Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003).
98. Schechter, supra note 88, at 831.
99. Id. at 825.
100. CALLMANN, supra note 95, at § 21:12.
101. Schechter, supra note 88, at 831-32.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting a 1924 decision by the German court, Landesgericht at Elberfeld).
104. Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 430 (2003).
105. The Lanham Act of 1946, today codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125, created a civil action
for the misleading use of a trademark that "is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive as to the affiliation" of one person with another. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)
(2000). The Lanham Act also prevents a person from "misrepresent[ing] the nature, charac-
teristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities" in "commercial advertising or promotion." Id. at § I 125(a)(1)(B).
[Vol. 26
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fear of restricting speech protected under the First Amendment. 0 6 In 1995
Congress did pass a dilution amendment in the form of the FTDA. 1
07
B. State Dilution Law and Its Relationship to Federal Intellectual Property
Law
Illinois and approximately thirty states have adopted the language of
the 1964 or the 1992 International Trademark Association Model State
Trademark Bill, which states that the likelihood of dilution of a trademark's
distinctive quality is grounds for an injunction. 10 8 Most state dilution stat-
utes, therefore, have similar language. 10 9 Interpretation of the state dilution
statutes by courts, however, differs among the jurisdictions and results in
forum shopping. 1° Unlike the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, state stat-
utes do not require that a trademark qualify as "famous.""'
In 1977 the New York case of Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Me-
chanical Trades, Inc. 112 established the general inclination of state trade-
mark dilution law.' 13 The Allied court compared a diluting trademark to a
cancer that survives and spreads by latching onto the reputation of an estab-
lished business with a distinctive trademark.' 14 The purpose of New York's
anti-dilution statute was to prevent "the gradual whittling away of a firm's
distinctive trade-mark or name." ' 15 The New York statute provided that the
likelihood of dilution of a trademark's distinctive quality would be grounds
for an injunction with or without the existence of competitive parties or the
lack of confusion as to the origin of the goods or services. 1t 6 When parties
are neither in competition nor producing similar goods, it is more problem-
atic for the unfair competition plaintiff to obtain relief due to the difficulty
of showing a likelihood of confusion between the parties' products or ser-
vices. 117 For example, under the New York dilution statute it is not impor-
tant that Tiffany's Jewelry is not confusable or in competition with Tif-
fany's Movie Theatre. 18 The Allied court noted that the name "Allied" is
106. Moseley, 537 U.S. at430-31.
107. Id. at 431.
108. MCCARTHY, supra note 88, at § 24:80.
109. Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17 FRANCHISE L.J.
111, 132 (1998).
110. Id.
111. CALLMANN, supra note 95, at § 22:13 (Cumulative Supplement).
112. 369 N.E. 2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1165.
115. Id. at 1166.
116. Id. at 1164.
117. Id. at 1165.
118. AlliedMaint. Corp., 369 N.E. at 1165-66.
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generic and found in the names of at least three hundred businesses in New
York City phone books.1 19 To qualify for protection from dilution a trade-
mark must be either distinctive or have secondary meaning. 12 0 The majority
in Allied did not state that a trademark's fame was a requirement for dis-
tinctiveness. 121 The court concluded that only the trademarks that are dis-
tinctive or have acquired secondary meaning for the public are entitled to
protection under New York's anti-dilution statute. 1
22
In 1988 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ob-
served that no conflict existed between an Illinois anti-dilution statute and
the federal Lanham Act.123 Without a conflict the court could not infer that
Congress intended for federal dilution law to override state anti-dilution
laws. 124 The Seventh Circuit also remarked that a fair-use defense requires
that the infringer used the trademark in good faith to simply describe goods
or services.125 A used car business may not have "The Greatest Used Car
Show on Earth" as its slogan, because it is a famous slogan of Ringling
Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Circus.' 26 In addition, a used car business is not
really putting on a show, so the slogan would not be descriptive of a car
dealership's goods and services. 1
27
Federal law also favors consistency in other areas of intellectual prop-
erty such as patents and copyrights. 128 A state's unfair competition law may
not prohibit someone from copying an item that is not patentable or copy-
rightable under federal law.129 State intellectual property laws that conflict
119. Id. at 1166.
120. See id. for a definition of "secondary meaning." See also supra note 95 for a discus-
sion on secondary meaning.
121. SIEGRuN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE § 9:2.4 (4th ed.
2002).
122. AlliedMaint. Corp., 369 N.E.2d at 1166.
123. Ringling Bros.-Barum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chev-
rolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 483 (7th Cir. 1988). A car dealership launched an advertising cam-
paign in 1985 using the slogan "The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth." Id. at 481. The
dealership made large signs with the slogan in large "red circus-style letters" that the dealer-
ship displayed in stores and television commercials. Id. In addition the dealership argued that
the Lanham Act's fair use defense, 15 U.S.C. § I1 15(b)(4), preempted the state anti-dilution
statute. Id. at 483. The fair use defense of federal law "provides a defense to an action that
would otherwise constitute trademark infringement if the mark is used fairly and in good
faith to describe the goods or services or their geographic origin." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 484.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (hold-
ing that state patent laws must yield to federal patent laws which create a balance between
the need to encourage inventors and the need to allow the public to freely use the patented
material after the patent expires).
129. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) (ruling that a state
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with federal patent laws are invalid.130 Moreover, the Patent and Copyright
Clauses in the United States Constitution advance "national uniformity in
the realm of intellectual property."' 13' If uniform national patent regulations
did not exist, a state could provide patent protection to state-based industries
and shield them from outside competition. 132 By enacting such regulations
as § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, Congress has incorporated principles of state
unfair competition into federal law.'
33
C. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA)
Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995,134 trademark dilu-
tion results when someone other than the registered owner of a trademark
uses the trademark in a manner that "causes dilution of the distinctive qual-
ity of the mark."'' 35 Although the FTDA defines trademark dilution, it does
not discuss how a plaintiff must prove that dilution has occurred.136 Trade-
cannot provide patent protection for a device, a pole lamp, that did not qualify for federal
patent protection).
130. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 152.
131. Id. at 162.
132. Id. at 163.
133. Id. at 166.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (2000). A trademark dilution plaintiff's remedy
under federal law is defined as follows:
(c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks
(1) the owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of eq-
uity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against
another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinc-
tive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this sub-
section. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may
consider factors such as, but not limited to--
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is
sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 188 1, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id.
135. Id. § 1125(c)(1).
136. Sandra Edelman & Bruce R. Ewing, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995:
A Litigation Perspective, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 485, 496 (1996).
2004]
UALR LAW REVIEW
mark dilution litigants and the judiciary have a history of difficulty in de-
termining the elements for proving dilution.1 37 For instance, the difficulty of
locating a witness who can testify as to a "gradual watering down of his or
her loyalty to a branded product" is a challenge in dilution litigation. 38 Not
surprisingly, courts fanned out in different directions when interpreting the
FTDA. 139 Some courts required plaintiffs to show actual harm to a trade-
mark to obtain an injunction of an offending use, while other courts required
plaintiffs to show only a likelihood of harm to the trademark.
40
1. Dilution by Blurring and Tarnishing
Prior to the FTDA, courts recognized two different types of trademark
dilution: dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishing.' 4' Dilution by blur-
ring involves a weakening of a trademark's ability to distinguish a particular
brand of a product and a diminished uniqueness of the trademark. 42 For
example, "Sacks Thrift Avenue" dilutes the distinctiveness of "Saks Fifth
Avenue."'' 43 Dilution by tarnishment occurs when a trademark is associated
with products or services of inferior quality to those it actually represents.' 44
Tarnishment is found when a trademark is "parodied in the context of ob-
scene, illegal, or unsavory activity. ' ' 145 An example of tarnishment is a
magazine's display of the Pillsbury Doughboy in sexually suggestive
poses. 46 The FTDA does not mention "dilution by blurring" or "dilution by
tarnishing" in the statutory language.1
4 7
137. Id.
138. Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Pro-
tection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122, 138 (1993).
139. Jennifer Mae Slonaker, Comment, Conflicting Interpretations of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act Create Inadequate Famous Mark Protection, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV.
121, 153 (2000).
140. Id.
141. KANE, supra note 121, at § 9:2.4[B].
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing Saks & Co. v. Hill, 843 F. Supp. 620, 625 (S.D. Cal. 1993)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga.
1981)).




2. Dilution and Free Speech: Trademarks as Parody and Protected
Speech
Parody is a form of protected expression under the First Amend-
ment. 48 There are two types of trademark parody. 49 The first type presents
the danger of public confusion as to the source of a product; whereas, the
second type does not present any danger of confusion. 50 An example of the
first type of trademark parody is when a parodist sells products, such as a
fast food restaurant other than McDonald's that sells McBagels.' 5 1 An ex-
ample of the second type of trademark parody is an "I Like Cocaine" t-shirt
with a Coca-Cola ad style."' The parodist is selling the parody itself, and
few consumers would think that Coca-Cola distributes "I Like Cocaine" t-
shirts.'53
A constitutional, incidental effect on expression results when trade-
mark law prevents someone from using another's trademark.154 The use of
anti-dilution statutes, however, to prevent the noncommercial use of a
trademark by someone participating in protected speech, such as editorials
or artistic comments, is unconstitutional.155 Parodies of famous trademarks
may offend famous trademark owners, but the parodies allow the public to
have fun with famous symbols that it encounters in day-to-day life. 156 If
famous trademark owners could smother all negative or offensive uses of
their mark in noncommercial contexts, then businesses could limit the
amount of useful criticism that the public is entitled to learn for the purpose
of making informed decisions. 17
148. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987).





154. L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 31. An incidental effect on expression occurs when a
trademark owner invokes an anti-dilution statute to prevent a defendant from using a trade-
mark to market unrelated goods without the permission of the trademark owner. Id. The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that any incidental effect on pro-
tected expression should be balanced with the purpose of the anti-dilution statute. Id. (citing
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979)). An anti-dilution statute is designed to pre-
vent a trademark's loss of respect in the public eye and loss of the capacity to identify prod-
ucts when the trademark is used improperly. Id.
155. Id. at 32-33. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit acknowledged
that courts cannot restrict the noncommercial use of a trademark without monitoring the
English language itself. Id. at 33 (citing Lucasfilm v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 935
(D.D.C. 1985)). The First Amendment protects a bawdy parody of the Miss America pag-
eant. Id. at 33 (citing Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982)).
156. See id. at 34.
157. Id. at 33.
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In 1987 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that the use of the Maine anti-dilution statute to enjoin the publishers of a
magazine from parodying the L.L. Bean logo in a raunchy context was an
unconstitutional limit on protected expression 58 The magazine displayed
the L.L. Bean logo alongside sexually explicit content. 159 The court stated
that a trademark holder may not smother the efforts of others who want to
use the trademark to express ideas and viewpoints. 160
In 1994, nonetheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit took an alternative route and held that a competitor lawnmower
company could not parody the John Deere logo in an ad comparing the two
companies' products.' 6' The competitor's television ad depicted the John
Deere "deer" as a terrified two-dimensional cartoon that runs away from a
dog and the competitor's lawn tractor. 62 The court determined that the ad
came within New York's dilution statute because the ad presented the risk
that the public would learn to associate the John Deere trademark with sub-
standard products.1
63
D. The Circuit Split: Likelihood of Dilution or Actual Dilution?
Before and after the passage of the FTDA, courts used different stan-
dards to evaluate trademark dilution claims.' 64 Many circuit court decisions
used the likelihood of dilution standard when evaluating dilution cases. 165 A
minority of decisions, however, used the actual dilution standard when
evaluating dilution claims. 66 The United States Supreme Court's decision
in Moseley resolved this circuit split.'
67
1. A Preponderance of Trademark Dilution Decisions Favored the
Traditional Likelihood of Dilution Standard
In 1983 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit de-
cided Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc.,168 in which the plaintiff sued for
trademark dilution of the name of its clothing line, "Sally Gee," by the name
158. Id.
159. Id. at 27.
160. L.L. Bean, Inc., 811 F.2d at 29.
161. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39,46 (2d Cir. 1994).
162. Id. at 41.
163. Id. at 45.
164. See Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003).
165. See infra Part III(D)(l).
166. See infra Part III(D)(2).
167. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433. See also infra Part IV.
168. 699 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1983).
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of a competing brand, "Sally Lee."' 69 The court was not swayed by Sally
Gee's argument and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Sally Gee's
likelihood of dilution claim. 70 The Second Circuit stated that the "Sally
Lee" brand name did not cause a likelihood of dilution by blurring, and
"discerning consumers of women's apparel are unlikely to have blurred
vision causing them to see 'Sally Gee' upon viewing a Sally Lee label.' 17'
To succeed on a dilution claim, the court stated that Sally Gee must show
that the public associates the Sally Lee trademark with Sally Gee cloth-
ing. 1 72 The court remarked that the record held no proof that the defendant's
use of the trademark Sally Lee caused a blurring of Sally Gee's "product
identification." 
73
In another United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit deci-
sion, Judge Sweet's concurrence in Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Mo-
tor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. listed six factors to consider for the likelihood of dilu-
tion by blurring: (1) similarity of the marks, (2) similarity of the products
covered by the marks, (3) sophistication of consumers, (4) predatory intent,
(5) renown of the senior mark and (6) renown of the junior mark. 174 The
majority opinion in Mead extracted the "distinctive quality capable of dilu-
tion" requirement from Allied and the likelihood of dilution requirement
from Sally Gee to form a rule for determining the likelihood of dilution be-
tween two similar-sounding trademarks. 175 In Mead, the name "Lexus" for a
luxury car did not result in a likelihood of dilution for the name of a com-
puterized legal research service, "Lexis.' 76 Although Judge Sweet con-
curred in the result, he disagreed that the name "Lexis" is not a strong
trademark. 77 Judge Sweet, however, did acknowledge that "Lexis" has
"limited renown" with a select group of consumers and that Toyota Motor
Sales lacked predatory intent. 178 If Toyota had predatory intent, it would
have had knowledge of the Lexis trademark and would have adopted the
169. Id. at 622.




174. Mead Data Cent. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir.
1989).
175. See id. at 1030.
176. Id. at 1032. The plaintiff had used the name LEXIS to market its legal research
system since 1972. Id. at 1027. In 1987 the defendant, Toyota, launched a luxury car line
called LEXUS. Id. at 1028. Before Toyota named its new car "LEXUS," Toyota's legal
advisors gave the opinion that 'here is absolutely no conflict between 'LEXIS' and
'LEXUS."' Id.
177. Id. at 1040 (Sweet, J., concurring).
178. Id. (Sweet, J., concurring).
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Lexus trademark with the intent of profiting from the similarity to the Lexis
trademark. 1
79
Because the First Amendment protects parody of famous trade-
marks,180 parody may help to absolve a trademark dilution defendant for
creating a new product that spoofs a famous product.' 8' The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the Muppet charac-
ter Spa'am did not create a likelihood of dilution for the Hormel Foods
product, SPAM. 182 Hormel Foods could not show that Jim Henson Produc-
tions' use of the name Spa'am would cause "negative associations," that
Jim Henson Productions was in direct competition with Hormel, or that the
parody was not intrinsic in Spa'am. 83 Spa'am, therefore, did not present a
likelihood of dilution for SPAM under a tamishment theory.
184
After passage of the FTDA, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recognized that the language of the FTDA specifies that a
necessary element for a dilution claim is that the junior mark "must cause
dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior mark," but the court contin-
ued to evaluate trademark dilution cases under a likelihood of dilution the-
ory. 185 For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit determined that Nabisco's use of goldfish-shaped cheesecrackers
caused a likelihood of dilution of the distinctiveness of Pepperidge Farm's
famous goldfish-shaped cheesecrackers. 86 Pepperidge Farm did not have to
provide proof of "actual loss of revenue" or conduct consumer surveys to
show that its famous, senior mark lost distinctiveness due to Nabisco's
goldfish-shaped cracker. 87 According to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, linking lost revenue to dilution of a trademark is
speculative and very difficult. 88 The Second and Seventh Circuits disagreed
with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows v. Utah Division of Travel Development,'89 where the
Fourth Circuit required proof of actual dilution of the circus's slogan
"Greatest Show on Earth." 190
179. Id. at 1037 (Sweet, J., concurring).
180. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987).
181. See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).
182. Id. at 508.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1999) (empha-
sis added).
186. Id. at 218.
187. Id. at 223-24.
188. Id. at 224.
189. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
190. See id. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction of the
defendant's use of a similar cheese cracker based on a finding of a likelihood of dilution. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit required a dilution plaintiff, Eli Lilly & Company,
to show a likelihood of dilution of the trademark "Prozac" by the defen-
dant's trademark "Herbrozac."' 19' The court noted that the FTDA does not
use the word "likelihood" with respect to finding dilution but nonetheless
proceeded to decide the case based on a likelihood of dilution theory. 92
According to the Seventh Circuit, if trademark owners could not sue for an
injunction of the use of a diluting trademark before suffering actual dam-
ages, new companies would not be able to obtain a declaratory judgment
that their junior mark is distinctive enough from a senior mark before in-
vesting in putting a new product on the market.1 93 Under the Seventh Cir-
cuit's reasoning, a showing of actual dilution "holds plaintiffs to an impos-
sible level of proof,"' 94 and proving dilution with consumer surveys is
costly and unreliable. 95 The court stated that with a famous product such as
Prozac, the distinctiveness of the trademark Prozac may suffer dilution
while sales are increasing, but sales would not increase as much as they
would without the presence of a similar, junior trademark. 96 The Seventh
Circuit stated in dicta that it doubted that Congress would enact the FTDA
with an impossible level of proof for the plaintiff. 1
97
2. The Actual Dilution Minority
Under the FTDA, a showing of either dilution by blurring or dilution
by tarnishment is not necessary to show actual dilution. 98 The FTDA re-
stricts the use of a trademark that "causes dilution of the distinctive quality"
of a famous trademark. 99 In 1998 the Ninth Circuit affirmed that a defen-
dant's conduct in registering Panavision's famous trade name as his own
Internet domain name caused dilution of the capacity of the "Panavision"
mark to identify goods and services.200 The Ninth Circuit followed the lan-
guage of the FTDA in affirming that the defendant, Toeppen, had "dimin-
at 223. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468-69 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the defendant's herbal remedy "Herbrozac" caused a likelihood of dilution of
the plaintiffs trademark "Prozac"). Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding proof of actual harm
necessary for a trademark dilution claim).
191. Eli Lilly & Co., 233 F.3d at 469.
192. Id. at 467, 469.




197. EliLilly & Co., 233 F.3d at 468.
198. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998).
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). See also supra note 134 and accompanying text.
200. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327.
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ished 'the capacity of the Panavision marks to identify and distinguish
Panavision's goods and services on the Internet.'" 20 1 Panavision had sued
Toeppen for his habit of "cyber pira[cy]" in registering famous trademarks
and setting up domain names on the Internet in order to sell the domain
names to the trademark owners.20 2 The Ninth Circuit stated that courts do
not have to evaluate dilution cases with the traditional dilution by blurring
203and dilution by tarnishing concepts.
In 1999 the Fourth Circuit's decision in Ringling Brothers.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Division of Travel Development?04 estab-
lished a precedent for future decisions holding that a showing of actual dilu-
tion is required under the FTDA.2 5 The court reasoned that if the FTDA
does not require trademark dilution plaintiffs to show proof of actual dilu-
tion, the lack of a proof requirement may create a "property-right-in-gross
interpretation.' 20 6 The Fourth Circuit observed in dicta that a junior use of a
trademark similar to a famous trademark might actually "enhance a senior
mark's 'magnetism'-by drawing renewed attention to it as a mark of un-
shakable eminence worthy of emulation by an unthreatening non-
competitor., 20 7 Under the Fourth Circuit rule, a plaintiff must show three
things in a trademark dilution case under the FTDA: (1) a defendant has
used a junior mark that is similar enough to a famous, senior mark "to evoke
in a relevant universe of consumers a mental association of the two that (2)
has caused (3) actual economic harm to the famous mark's economic value
by lessening its former selling power as an advertising agent for its goods or
services. 2°8 The Fourth Circuit admitted that its rule is a strict interpretation
of trademark dilution under the FTDA.2°9
In the Fourth Circuit's view, Ringling's consumer survey evidence
failed to prove that Utah's slogan "The Greatest Snow on Earth" caused a
lessening of the capacity of Ringling's slogan "The Greatest Show on
Earth" to identify and distinguish the Ringling circus.210 The Ringling sur-
201. Id. at 1326 (quoting Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304
(C.D. Cal. 1996)).
202. Id. at 1318. The Federal Anti-Cybersquatting Act of 1999 has rendered cybersquat-
ting virtually non-existent. See MCCARTHY, supra note 88, at § 24:69.1.
203. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1326.
204. 170 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir. 1999).
205. See Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
206. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 459. The Fourth Circuit expressed its doubt that Con-
gress intended to create an unlimited in time property right "via injunction." Id. If Congress
had intended to do so, it would have restricted the use of any substantially similar second-in-
time trademark. Id.
207. Id. at 460.
208. ld. at 461.




vey showed that in Utah, twenty-four percent of the consumers surveyed
filled in "THE GREATEST ON EARTH" with only the word
"snow," whereas outside of Utah, zero percent of the consumers surveyed
filled in only the word "snow. ' '21 The slogan, "Greatest Snow on Earth,"
was probably very well known within Utah, because every license plate in
the state displayed the slogan.212 According to one expert, those conducting
consumer surveys to test for trademark recognition should wait until the
defendant's trademark or slogan has "come[] to enjoy at least a certain
measure of widespread use. 21 The slogan "Greatest Snow on Earth" was
well known in Utah but relatively unknown outside of Utah.214 One of the
factors that a court may consider in determining whether or not a trademark
is distinctive and famous within the meaning of the FTDA is the "geo-
graphical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used. 21 5
The Fifth Circuit followed the Fourth Circuit's lead in 2000 and con-
sidered the plain meaning of the language of the FTDA in requiring proof of
216actual dilution. Because the Fifth Circuit required proof of actual dilution,
PRL USA Holdings, Inc. failed to show that a magazine title "POLO"
caused dilution of the Ralph Lauren logo "Polo.
2 17
Also in 2000, the Sixth Circuit remanded a case to the district court for
clarification of a dilution issue: whether the Exxon cartoon tiger caused
dilution of Kellogg's "Tony the Tiger."218 Kellogg had to show that Exxon's
use of its cartoon tiger "lessened the capacity of Tony the Tiger to identify
and represent Kellogg's food products." 219 The district court mixed dilution
theories to find that because Kellogg had demonstrated that Exxon's use of
its cartoon tiger resulted in actual dilution by blurring, a likelihood of dilu-
tion by blurring also existed.22° In 2001 the Sixth Circuit formally rejected
the actual harm requirement and adopted the Nabisco, Inc. likelihood-of-
dilution requirement to determine that an independent store named Victor's
Little Secret caused a likelihood of dilution of the famous trademark Victo-
ria's Secret.221
211. Id. at 462.
212. Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary Mean-
ing, Genericism, Fame, Confusion and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1053 (2001).
213. Id.
214. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 462.
215. See 15 U.S.C. § 125(c)(1)(D) (2000). See also supra note 134, at § 1 125(c)(1)(D).
216. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, 214 F.3d 658, 670 (5thCir. 2000).
217. Id. at 658.
218. Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 576-77 (6th Cir. 2000).
219. Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 790, 804 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
220. See id. at 808.




The United States Supreme Court reversed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's decision in Moseley and held that the FTDA
requires a plaintiff in a trademark dilution case to show proof of actual harm
to the trademark's economic value.222 The Court granted certiorari because
of the circuit split over whether the FTDA requires proof of actual harm to a
trademark.223 Before analyzing Victoria's Secret's dilution claim, the Court
discussed the history of trademark dilution and Congress's intent in passing
the FTDA.224
A. The History of Trademark Dilution
The Court traced the development of the concept of trademark dilution
from the traditional concept of trademark infringement to the state dilution
statutes in effect before the FTDA.225 The Court acknowledged that the law
of unfair competition includes the law of trademark infringement. 6 The
Court, in addition, noted that unfair competition law in the United States is
rooted in English common law, and that Congress incorporated the common
law concepts of trademark infringement in the Lanham Act of 1946.227 Vic-
toria's Secret did not appeal the district court's grant of the Moseleys' Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment on Victoria's Secret's trademark infringement
and unfair competition claims.228 The Court, therefore, assumed that the use
of the name Victor's Little Secret neither caused nor was likely to cause
confusion for consumers.22 9 Also, the Court assumed that the Moseleys'
store was not a competitive threat to Victoria's Secret. 230 The Court, never-
theless, emphasized that neither the absence of a likelihood of confusion nor
the lack of competition between the parties bars a claim under the FTDA.231
Noting that the concept of trademark dilution was not derived from the
common law, the Court turned to a discussion of the origin of trademark
dilution in Frank Schechter's 1927 Harvard Law Review article.232
Schechter proposed that "'the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark
222. Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003).
223. Id. at 428.
224. Id. at 428-31.
225. Id. at 428-30.
226. Id. at 428.
227. Id. at 428-31.
228. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423-24, 428.






should constitute the only rational basis for its protection.' 233 In 1947 Mas-
sachusetts enacted the first state law prohibiting trademark dilution. 234 The
Massachusetts statute provided relief for both dilution and the likelihood of
harm to a business's reputation.235 The Court noted that approximately
twenty-five states had passed dilution statutes similar to the Massachusetts
statute in the forty-eight years before the enactment of the FTDA.2 36
B. Congress's Intent in Passing the FTDA
Congress first considered enacting a federal anti-dilution statute in
1988.237 Congress, however, did not enact a dilution amendment to the
Lanham Act because of the fear of a potential application of the dilution
statute to protected speech under the First Amendment.238 When the FTDA
was introduced to Congress in 1995, it contained two exceptions to allow
for First Amendment issues.239 The first exception provided for the "fair
use" of a registered trademark in comparative advertising and promotion,
while the second exception provided that the noncommercial use of a regis-
tered trademark would not amount to dilution.240 The Court noted that the
House of Representatives unanimously passed the FTDA and that the Sen-
ate later passed the FTDA without hearings.241
C. The Court Decides: Likelihood of Dilution v. Actual Dilution
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Victoria's Secret trademark
is valuable and that the Moseleys had conceded that the Victoria's Secret
trademark is famous within the meaning of the FTDA.242 The Moseleys,
furthermore, did not assert that the FTDA prohibits dilution by the identical
use of a famous trademark.243 The Court stated that even if the Moseleys
had claimed that the FTDA only applies to identical uses of famous trade-
marks, the statutory language did not lend itself to such a narrow reading.
244
233. id. (discussing Schechter, supra note 88, at 31). See also supra notes 88, 98-99,
100-02 and accompanying text.




238. Id. at 431.
239. Id.
240. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 431 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(4)(2000)).
241. Id. Senator Hatch declared that the purpose of the FTDA was "'to protect famous
trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or dis-
parage it."' Id. (citing 141 CONG. REc. 38559-61 (1995)).





Turning to the lower courts' findings of dilution by tarnishment and
blurring, the Supreme Court questioned whether the language of the statute
included dilution by tarnishment.245 The Court emphasized the contrast be-
tween the FTDA and the state statutes that clearly provided for harm to
business reputation and for dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade-
mark.246 The FTDA only provides for dilution of the distinctive quality of a
trademark, thus supporting a narrow interpretation of the FTDA with re-
spect to dilution by tarnishing.247 Indeed, the contrast between state anti-
dilution statutes and the FTDA presented the Court with the issue it had to
resolve: Does the FTDA require proof of a likelihood of dilution or proof of
actual dilution for a valid claim?
248
1. The Unambiguous Requirement ofActual Harm Under the FTDA
The Supreme Court determined that the FTDA is unambiguous in re-
quiring proof of actual dilution of a trademark.249 The FTDA provides that
"'the owner of a famous mark' is entitled to injunctive relief against another
person's commercial use of a mark or trade name if that use 'causes dilution
of the distinctive quality' of the famous mark., 250 The Court concluded that
the statutory text of the FTDA requires proof of actual dilution and not a
likelihood of dilution.25' To reinforce its conclusion that the FTDA requires
actual dilution, the Court pointed to the definition of dilution found in 15
U.S.C. § 1127, which first defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity
of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services., 252 The stat-
ute then provides for dilution "'regardless of the presence or absence of -
(1) competition"' between the parties or "'(2) the likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception."'' 253 The Court determined that the contrast between
the initial definition of dilution in the statute and the later provision for the
likelihood of confusion solidifies its decision that the FTDA requires proof
of actual dilution.254
245. Id. at 432-33.
246. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432-33.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 433.
250. Id. at 432-33 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000)) (emphasis added).
251. Id. at 433.
252. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).




2. Proof ofActual Dilution
Although the FTDA requires proof of actual dilution, the Court stated
that a trademark dilution plaintiff does not necessarily have to show a loss
of sales or profits. 5 The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit's opinion to that end in Ringling Brothers. 6 The Court,
however, agreed with the Fourth Circuit that when the trademarks in ques-
tion are not identical, the fact that a consumer makes a mental link between
the famous trademark and a similar trademark does not constitute dilu-
tion. 7 The fact that a similar trademark reminds a consumer of a famous
trademark may not always "reduce the capacity of the famous mark to iden-
tify the goods of its owner," which the FTDA requires. 8
The Court observed that the colonel who reported the existence of the
Moseleys' store to Victoria's Secret did make the mental association be-
tween the two stores, but the record does not show that use of the name Vic-
tor's Secret changed the colonel's opinion of Victoria's Secret.259 Moreover,
the Court noted a "complete absence of evidence of any lessening of the
capacity of the VICTORIA'S SECRET mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services sold in Victoria's Secret stores or advertised in its cata-
logs. '260 Also, Victoria's Secret's expert did not give an opinion as to the
effect of the trademark "Victor's Secret" on the strength of the Victoria's
Secret trademark.26'
Although the Court acknowledged Victoria's Secret's argument that
obtaining evidence of actual dilution through such methods as consumer
surveys is costly and untrustworthy, the Court stated that such direct evi-
dence may not be necessary if a plaintiff has circumstantial evidence that
shows actual dilution.262 When the famous trademark and the second-in-
time trademark are identical, the plaintiff may certainly use circumstantial
evidence to show actual dilution.263 The majority opinion concluded by em-
phasizing that the difficulty of obtaining proof is not a valid excuse for side-
stepping a requirement for statutory relief.
264
255. Id.
256. Id. at 433-34 (discussing Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460-65 (4th Cir. 1999)).
257. Id. at 433.
258. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.





264. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
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3. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which he proposed that
the word "capacity" in the FTDA should determine what factors are neces-
sary to show dilution.2 65 The concurrence stated that "[i]f a mark will erode
or lessen the power of the famous mark to give customers the assurance of
quality and the full satisfaction they have in knowing they have purchased
goods bearing the famous mark," a plaintiff may prove dilution. 66 Justice
Kennedy maintained that the majority did not rule out injunctive relief for
Victoria's Secret if it can show "sufficient evidence of either blurring or
tarnishment" on remand.267
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Victor Moseley and his mom-and-pop lingerie and adult novelty store
managed to bring about a significant departure from trademark dilution law
precedent. The Supreme Court's decision in Moseley ran counter to fifty-six
years of state dilution law history and overruled a majority of the lower fed-
eral courts which allowed proof of dilution upon a showing of a likelihood
of harm.268 The Moseley decision resolved a circuit split represented by the
conflicting decisions of the Fourth Circuit in Ringling Brothers and the Sec-
ond Circuit in Nabisco.269 This section discusses the issues involved in
proving actual harm to a trademark's economic value, the benefits of the
Moseley decision for owners of famous trademarks, and the importance of
the decision for product competition and the ingenuity of small business.
265. Id. at 435 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
266. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
267. Id. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
268. See KANE, supra note 121, at § 9:1.1 (relating that Massachusetts enacted the first
state anti-dilution statute in 1947); Ringling Bros. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449,
458 (4th Cir. 1999) (discussing how the most common aspect of state dilution laws is the
requirement of proof of a likelihood of dilution rather than proof of actual dilution for an
injunction); Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432-33 (using statutory construction to determine that the
FTDA requires proof of actual dilution rather than a likelihood of dilution as required by
most federal courts).
269. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the
Fourth Circuit's rule of requiring actual harm in a dilution case is inappropriate because of its
difficulty); Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 461 (holding that a trademark dilution plaintiff must
show proof of actual harm to a trademark to obtain relief under the FTDA).
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A. The Status of Trademark Dilution Post-Moseley: How Is Actual Harm
Proven?
According to the United States Supreme Court, proving actual harm to
a trademark's economic value means more than showing a consumer's men-
tal association with the famous mark but less than having to show proof of
dilution's consequences, such as loss of profits or sales. 270 The Court left the
clarification of the requirements of proving actual harm up to future deci-
sions under the FTDA.27 Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggested that the
owner of a famous trademark should not have to wait until the mark has lost
its distinctiveness to obtain an injunction.272 The majority, however, empha-
sized that a plaintiff must show economic harm to a trademark to prove di-
lution.273 Victoria's Secret pointed out that proving actual harm to a trade-
mark through such devices as consumer surveys is often difficult, expensive
and unreliable.274 In response the Court allowed that direct evidence of dilu-
tion is not required if circumstantial evidence showing dilution is avail-
able.275 The Court, for example, stated that a suitable situation for using
circumstantial evidence is when a trademark is put to an identical use.276 A
federal district court has since followed this example when it implicated the
identical use guideline in finding an FTDA violation.277
Perhaps if consumers had testified that they changed their perception
of Victoria's Secret, this would have qualified as evidence of actual dilu-
tion. The Supreme Court noted that the colonel who notified Victoria's Se-
cret of the Moseleys' store did not testify that he changed his opinion of
270. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
271. See id. at 433-34.
272. Id. at 435 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
273. Id. at 434.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434. In Ringling Bros. v. Utah Division of Travel Develop-
ment, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that "mental associa-
tion" is "presumed" with identical trademark use such as "the use of DUPONT shoes,
BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos." 170 F.3d 449, 459 n.5 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Appel-
lant's Br. at 14) (quoting (H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995)). The Supreme Court agreed
with the Fourth Circuit that when trademarks are not identical, mental association does not
constitute a valid dilution claim. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433. The Supreme Court then went on
to state that a dilution plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to prove actual dilution when
the trademarks in question are identical. Id. at 434.
277. Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2003). Pinehurst is the
owner of the famous Pinehurst Golf Resort. Id. at 425. The defendant registered the domain
name PinehurstResort.com and refused to transfer the name to Pinehurst, Inc. Id. at 426. The
district court found that the defendant's use of the domain name had caused economic harm
to Pinehurst's mark by reducing its marketing power. Id. at 431. Thus, the court found that
the defendant's identical use of the Pinehurst trademark had caused dilution of the mark in
violation of the FTDA. Id. at 432.
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Victoria's Secret after seeing the ad for Victor's Secret.278 Because the Su-
preme Court stated that dilution plaintiffs do not have to show actual profit
279losses, consumer surveys showing that consumers changed their opinion
of Victoria's Secret may qualify as evidence of actual dilution. The Su-
preme Court, in addition, remarked that Victoria's Secret's expert had not
expressed an opinion on the effect of the name Victor's Secret on the
strength of the Victoria's Secret trademark. 8 ° If an expert can testify that a
similar trademark harms the economic strength of a famous trademark, this
may show actual dilution even without the availability of consumer surveys.
Although some courts will struggle to define exactly what proves ac-
tual harm to a trademark,281 others will continue to provide examples of
when dilution has occurred within the meaning of the FTDA.28 2 The Su-
preme Court did not apply the traditional concepts of dilution by tarnish-
ment or dilution by blurring in its analysis of the Moseley case. 283 In fact,
278. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
279. Id. at 433.
280. Id. at 434.
281. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Thelaw.net Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944-45
(S.D. Ohio 2003). The plaintiff owns several trademarks, including LEXIS-NEXIS and
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, and sued the defendant for causing dilution with the use of the
term "Wexis." Id. at 945. The district court stated that the plaintiff may proceed with its
dilution claim but also stated that winning a dilution claim after the Moseley decision is very
difficult. Id. at 953.
282. See, e.g., Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d
1268 (S.D. Fla. 2003). Four Seasons licensed the use of its trademarks to the defendant who
opened a hotel using the trademarks. Id. at 1271-72. When the hotel opened, the kitchen and
computer equipment were insufficient and the furnishings were not up to Four Seasons stan-
dards. Id. at 1275-76. The district court concluded that the defendant had lessened the capac-
ity of the Four Seasons trademarks to identify the level of quality associated with Four Sea-
sons. Id. at 1276-77. As evidence of actual harm, the court recognized the customer com-
plaints about the substandard state of the defendant's hotel. Id. The court considered the
customer complaints as actual harm sufficient to establish trademark dilution. Id.; see also
Golden W. Fin. v. WMA Mortgage Servs., No. C 02-05727, 2003 WL 1343019 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 13, 2003). In Golden West Financial, the district court used the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Moseley to support its conclusion that the defendant's use of its trademark did not
cause dilution of the plaintiffs trademark. Id. at 8. The plaintiff claimed that its mark, World
Mortgage, was famous before the defendant used the term "world" in its trademarks identify-
ing its mortgage service. Id. at 1. The court determined that because the plaintiffs customers
could still identify and contact them, the plaintiffs trademark had not decreased in value. Id.
at 8.
283. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432-33. The Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit used the concepts of dilution by blurring and by tarnishing in affirming
the district court's finding of a likelihood of dilution. Id. at 432. The Moseleys did not contest
that dilution by tarnishment is relevant. Id. The Court, however, questioned whether the
concept of dilution by tarnishment is included in the language of the FTDA. See id. The
FTDA refers to dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark whereas state statutes refer
to both harm to business reputation and dilution of a trademark's distinctiveness. Id.
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the Court narrowed the scope of dilution when it used basic statutory con-
struction to determine the definition of dilution.284
Perhaps the Moseley decision has established a more concrete concept
of dilution that will lead to consistent applications of the FTDA. The old
likelihood of dilution standard is a nebulous concept that may have allowed
trademark owners too much freedom in asserting their rights.285 Because
trademark owners did not have to show actual harm to the economic value
of a trademark, courts had to subjectively determine whether or not a likeli-
hood of dilution existed.286 By requiring actual harm, the Supreme Court
has established that a trademark dilution plaintiff must show real and identi-
fiable injuries for which a court may grant relief.
287
B. Benefits of the Moseley Decision for Owners of Famous Trademarks
The owners of famous trademarks cannot take much solace from the
Moseley decision, but there are some benefits of the decision for the owners
of famous trademarks. Perhaps Victoria's Secret sued the Moseleys because
of the fear that if Victoria's Secret did not pursue a dilution claim against
the Moseleys, failing to police its trademark rights would preclude future
dilution claims. After the Moseley decision, however, Victoria's Secret and
other owners of famous trademarks may not have to police every use of a
similar trademark that may cause a likelihood of dilution. Failing to pursue
dilution claims against businesses like Victor's Secret may not result in the
preclusion of dilution claims under the actual harm standard.
Prior to the Moseley decision, a trademark dilution plaintiffs remedy
depended largely on where the plaintiff filed suit.288 The Supreme Court
ruling may now help to ensure that courts decide FTDA claims consistently
and that trademark owners will have a secure remedy regardless of where
they file suit. A trademark owner may rely on the principle that if a trade-
mark suffers actual economic harm from dilution, the trademark owner may
certainly obtain relief under the FTDA. Trademark owners will be aware
that filing claims under the FTDA when only a likelihood of dilution is pre-
sent will not ensure a court granting an injunction of the use of an offending
trademark. 289 Knowing what factors constitute actual harm will enable
284. See id.
285. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the idea that Congress intended to create
property rights in gross with the FTDA).
286. Id. at 458.
287. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
288. Slonaker, supra note 139, at 122-23.
289. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
2004]
UALR LAW REVIEW
trademark owners to determine if they have valid FTDA claims. 29 0 As new
cases arise under the FTDA different examples of actual harm will expand
the Supreme Court's decision in Moseley and allow trademark owners to
quickly recognize when they should act to protect their trademarks from
dilution.291
C. The Importance of Creativity and Flexibility for Independent Small
Business Owners
The Moseley decision supports the public interest in encouraging the
development of new business. Entrepreneurs might be hesitant to enter the
marketplace if they have to be absolutely sure that their trademark is not
similar enough to a famous trademark to cause a likelihood of dilution. This
does not mean, however, that trademarks may be so similar as to cause a
292likelihood of confusion. Victor Moseley creatively named his business to
represent his wish to keep his new venture a secret from his former em-
ployer, friends and family.293 Although the name of Mr. Moseley's store,
Victor's Secret, is almost identical to Victoria's Secret, it is doubtful that
the average consumer would seriously think that the two stores were associ-
ated with each other.294
290. See id. at 435 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated that the "eviden-
tiary showing required by the statute can be clarified on remand." Id. (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
291. See id. at432-33.
292. id. at 428. The Court noted that the Lanham Act of 1946 prohibits trademark use
that causes a likelihood of confusion concerning the source of a good or service. Id; see also
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
293. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 3, Moseley (No. 01-1015); Savage, supra note 1.
294. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429.
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In addition, the public has a strong interest in finding low-price prod-
ucts comparable to famous high-quality products. Consumers often use
comparison shopping to find the best product at the cheapest price. Similar-
ity among the trademarks of a particular kind of product may help a con-
sumer to find products comparable to those sold under a famous trademark.
Products sold under a famous trademark are often more expensive than ge-
neric brands, even though the products may be of the same quality. Without
competition from new or generic brands of a product, the producers of a
good sold under a famous trademark may enjoy a monopoly over that par-
ticular market. Some similarity in the trademarks of a specific kind of prod-
uct may facilitate competition between the products and encourage produc-
ers to develop improved versions of that product.
Future court decisions will clarify what proves actual harm under the
FTDA. If the owners of famous trademarks can demonstrate actual harm to
the economic value of their trademarks, the trademark owners now have a
more reliable remedy with a greater promise of consistent application than
the amorphous likelihood of dilution standard. If the United States Supreme
Court had affirmed the Sixth Circuit's application of the likelihood of dilu-
tion standard in the Moseley case, the decision would have forced small
business owners like the Moseleys to exhaustively determine whether their
choice of a business name might result in the likelihood of dilution of a fa-
mous trademark.
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